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Abstract
In 19G3, Debreu and Scarf proved Edge-worth's conjecture that the core of an e::
economy converges to the competitive equilibria as the number of traders gets large. Un-
fortunately. Muench(1973) demonstrated that this result can not be generalized to a public
goods economy. This is due to the increasing returns to coalitional size that are embedded
in the public goods technology. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions
under which core convergence can be regained when public goods are present. We show-
that if all consumers become asymptotically satiated in public good, then the core of a
replication economy converges to the set Lindahl equilibria. Asymptotic satiation means
that the value to consumers, in terms of private goods, of receiving some multiple of theii
current level of public goods consumption goes to zero as the level goes to infinity. This
assumption is trivially implied if consumers become satiated in public good, we also show
that strict non-satiation, which is almost the inverse of asymptotic satiation, is a sufficient
condition for core convergence. Strict non-satiation mean that consumers' marginal rates
of substitution of public for private goods is strictly bounded from zero. Finally, sufficient
conditions for core non-convergence are investigated. We show asymptotic satiation and
strict non-satiation are close be being necessary conditions for core convergence.
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1. Introduction
In 19G3, Debreu and Scarf proved Edgeworth's conjecture that the core of an excha
economy converges to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations as the number of
traders gets large. It would be quite surprising, of course, to observe an allocation that
is not in the core as an equilibrium outcome of any game. This includes games derived
from economic situations. Such an outcome would violate the basic economic hypothesis
that agents always do as well as they can given their constraints. And so the knowledge
that the competitive allocations are in fact the only ones that remain in the core as the
economy gets large is of great practical importance. It confirms the central position of
competitive equilibrium in economic theory, and provides a justification for the study of
such subjects as comparative statics, stability, and computable general equilibrium.
It is natural to wonder whether or not this result can be generalized to an economy
with public goods. Here the question becomes: Does the core of a public goods economy
converge to the set Lindahl equilibrium allocations. l Muench (1973) demonstrates that
such a generalization is not possible. He provides a simple example with a continuum
of identical consumers in which the core contains many allocations while the Lindahl
equilibrium is unique. The increasing returns to coalitional size that are embedded in the
public goods technology are at the root of his result. In essence, the presence of public
goods causes the game generated by the economy to be highly super-additive, which in
ruin causes the core to be large. This calls into question the value of paying the same
careful attention to Lindahl equilibrium that has be given to competitive equilibrium.
The main purpose 1 of this paper is to investigate 1 the conditions under which core-
convergence can be regained when public goods are present. The question is addi
using a replica, instead of a continuum economy. This is because it is difficult to interpret
allocations in a public goods economy with a continuum of consumers. For example, if
there is any measurable Level of public goods in an allocation, then the ratio of public
The Lindahl equilibrium is the natural analog of competitive equilibria for a public goods economj
Samuelson (1954), and Foley (1970) among others.
to private goods consumption for all consumers is infinity. How does one compare two
such allocations. After all, infinity is infinity. Is it meaningful to say that consumers
prefer a larger infinity of public goods to a smaller one? On the other hand, it is funda-
mentally impossible to differentiating among allocations in which the public goods level
is unmeasurable (almost zero). For such allocations the ratio of public to private goods
consumption for each consumer could be bounded, or undefined. Distinguishing these two
cases is important, and only possible in a finite economy.
The most important result presented in this paper is that the core of a replica economy
with technology that exhibits constant returns to scale, and consumers who have convex,
continuous, and monotonic preferences, converges to the set of Lindahl equilibrium alloca-
tions if all agents become asymptotically satiated in public goods. An agent's preferences
are said to exhibit asymptotic satiation if the value to the agent, in terms of private good.
of receiving some multiple of his current public goods consumption level goes to zero as
the level of public good goes to infinity.
This does not seem to be a terribly unreasonable assumption to make about agents'
preferences for many kinds of public goods. For example, if an agent had ten channels on
his cable system, he might be willing to pay a lot for ten more. But if ho already had
one hundred, would he care that much about another hundred? Certainly, if he ahead}'
had one thousand, adding another thousand would hardly improve his welfare at all. Or
take a public park as an example. While a larger park is always better, an agent would
probably care less and less about each successive doubling of the park's size. Eventually,
the park gets so big that the agent can never hope to see the whole thing in any event.
Obviously, asymptotic satiation is trivially satisfied if agents actually become satiated in
public goods.
We also show that strict non-satiation in public goods is a sufficient condition for core
convergence, A consumer's preferences are said to exhibit strict non-satiation if the desire
for public goods is so strong that the marginal rate of substitution of public for private
goods is everywhere strictly bounded from zero. For example, this assumption is satisfied
if public and private goods are perfect substitutes.
Strict non-satiation is a much less realistic assumption than asymptotic satiation. In
particular, it implies that almost all the private good is devoted to public goods production
for every allocation in the core of a sufficiently large economy. Empirically, this does not
seem to be a very common situation. One reason that the implications of this assumption
are considered is that it is that strict non-satiation is essentially the polar opposite of
asymptotic satiation. It is therefore of some theoretical interest to note that despite this,
both assumptions imply core convergence.
A more important reason for its inclusion becomes evident when the problem of suf-
ficient conditions for core non-convergence is taken up in section four. These sufficient
conditions turn out to be almost, but not quite, the negation of asymptotic satiation and
strict non-satiation. Whether or not the gap between economies for with the core can
be shown to converge and not to converge can be completely closed is an open question.
While section four shows that the gap is narrow, it falls short of giving necessary and
sufficient conditions for core convergence. However, this section does allow the conclusion
that there is no hope of proving a general core convergence theorem for a public goods
economy. If fact, non-convergence seems to be more common, perhaps even generic, for
such economies.
2. The Model
A simple replica economy, £R , with T types of consumers indexed by t £ T =
{1, . .
.
, T}, and R consumers of each type indexed by r £ % = {1, . . . , R], is considered.
Each consumer type has complete and transitive preferences >z t defined over A' = $1+ + 1 ,
a one private good, M public good consumption set where public goods are indexed by
m £ M. = {1, . .
.
, M}. A typical consumption bundle in X will be written (x;y) where x is
a level of private good, and y is a vector of public goods. Agents will typically be referred
to by their number and type. Thus {r,t} is agent number r of type t. Superscripts are
used to represent agents and subscripts to represent types of public goods. Superscripts
and subscripts will also sometimes be used to distinguish different vectors of goods from
one another, but this will be done a way that prevents confusion.
The following assumptions are made on >z t for all t £ T
.
Al) ^zt is continuous.
A2) If (x-y) y t (s'jy'j, then for all A £ [0,1], A(i,y) + (1 - \){x';y') ht (x';y').
(Weak convexity)
A3) If (x',y) > (x';y'), then 2 (x;y) y t {x'',y')\ also, if x > a;', and i/ > y', then {x\y) >- t
[x'-y').
(Monotonicity in all goods, and strict monotonicity in the private good)
Define the A* dimensional simplex A h as:
K - ) n ,- snA'+la* = <pe&+ Ew = 1 '- 1
1=1
Note that monotonicity implies that all prices are non-negative, and in addition, the price
of the private good is positive.
Let Y C 3ft- x ${'+ denote the production set. A typical feasible production plan is written
(z; y) where : is a negative number which is interpreted as the input of private good, and
" The three kinds of vector inequalities are represented by >, >, and ^>.
Iy is a positive output vector of public goods. Define the marginal cost correspon for
Y. MC :F-> AM , as follows:
MC(z;y) = {(p;q) £ AM \ (p;q)(z;y) > (p;q)(z';y')V (z';y') eY} .
The production set is assumed to satisfy:
Bl ) 1' is a closed convex cone.
B2) rn:R|,+ 1 = {0}.
B3) There exists > such that for all m £ M., all [z\y] £ Y, and all [p\ q) £
MC(z;y), qm /p < 4>.
Finally, one assumption is made on the u;* for all t £ T :
CD w' > 0.
Let G R denote the grand coalition for the economy SR . A Lindahl equilibrium for a
coalition S C G' 7* is a vector (x; y;p; q) £ ftj
5
' X 3£+ x A I 5 I A/
,
such that:
V{r,t}£5, (p;q rJ )(x r - t ;y)<p^ t (.4),
(x r ' t;y)ht(x;y)\/(x-y)£Xs.t.(p
] q
r
'
t )(x
]
y)<pu; t . (D)
( Y, (^-^);y) er. (C)
r,f}€S
and
V(5;y)€F,
« E *r,l
J ( E [*-•*-«*];») > (p; E * r"' )(**) <*»
{r,t}€S / \{r,t}eS / \ {r,t}€S J
Now define the set of Lindahl allocations for a coalition S C G as:
1(5) = {(.r:j/)£.4 51 x.^7 | 3
3 (/;: q ) £ A ' 5 ' s.t. (x; y;/r. 5) is a Lindahl equilibrium for 5 ?
The separating price correspondence for >^ t , H l : X — AM is defined as:
H t (x;y) = {(p;q)eAM
\ (4)
0;?)(z;y) < (p;^)(^';y') V(xVy') e A' s.t. (z';y') >-< U-;y)} •
Note that the range of H t is AM . This means that the prices given by H t are not be
the same prices faced by the agent at a Lindahl equilibrium for a coalition S since these
prices are elements of A ' s I M . However, if (x; y) is a Lindahl allocation, then there must
exist normalization factors k r,t E (0, 1] for each agent that can be used to put the prices
[p\ q) € H t (x 1 ; y) back into A ' s ' M . This normalization is described in detail below.
An allocation (x; y) for a coalition S is said to be S-optimal if it is feasible for 5. and
there does not exist a feasible Pareto dominant allocation {x\y) for S. Formally. (.r;//> is
S-optimal if
Sr,t}es J
fl (5.; y) e »j 5 ' x ^ s.t. ]T l* r,t - w 'l ; $ I G *'
V{M}e5, (5 r,';y)>:«(s r,t ;y),
and
3{r,t}eSs.t.(x r > t ;y)y t (x r ' t ;y).
It will frequently be convenient to take advantage of the fact that the well known
Samuelson conditions must be satisfied bv anv 5-optimal allocation. This mav be stated
iii the notation of this paper in the following way. If an allocation (x;y) for a coalition
S G (Tt,/? is 5-optimal, then
V{rj)e5, 3(pr'^ r'<)€#(x r'<;y), 3 and 3 k rJ . e (0, 1)
s.t. A-''' X p
r
'< = p, (p; A-
1
"
1 X g
1
-
1
,
. . . ,
k R -T X q
li:r
) G A > S I M
,
and
3(p;q)eMC'l ]T [* r,t -w (];yj s.t. VmeM, £ ^ x «m =*5m-
Note that the normalization factor cancels out in the last line
s.\,
'+The offer correspondence, OC f : 9ft • —» ?)£+, is defined as follows:
OC t (y) = {xett+ | 3(p;g)€AM s.t. (5)
(p;g)(z;y) < P^,( and (x;y) bt (z';j/') V(x';y') G -X" s.t. (p; q){x' ; y' ) < pu
1
}
The graph of this correspondence is the offer curve for an agent of type t. The render may
verify that x G 0C(y) if and only if for some (p; q) £ H t (x; y), (p; g)(x; y) = pio''."1
An allocation (x; y) is in the core for the grand coalition GR if,
r,f}6G«
fl S C GR , and (!•; y) G .^|
S
' x R*1 s.t. ( ^ [.?'•' - w'] ;y ] 67,
{r,<}GS
and
and in addition:
VlMjeS.p^jlb^y),
3 (r,f)6Ss.t.(F' ( ;!/)h (x r, ';y).
This is just the usual requirement that no coalition can block any core allocation. Noti
that blocking coalitions can only consume the public goods produced using their own
resources. They cannot free ride off the public goods produced by the rest of the agents.
This follows Foley and others. The set of core allocations for the grand coalition G l will
be denoted by C[G R ).
In order to be assured that Lindahl equilibria exist, and are in the core, we will take
advantage of Foley's (1970) method of modeling public goods as jointly produced private
goods. If it can be shown that competitive equilibria exist, and are in the core for the
associated private goods economy, then it may be concluded that Lindahl equilibria exist
' Also see equation 8 below
and are in the core of the original public goods economy. But it is then easy to verify
that A1-A3. B1-B3 and CI imply all of the assumptions used by McKenzie (1981) to show-
existence. Milleron's (1972) theorem 4.1 may then be used to conclude that the Lindahl
equilibrium is always in the core. The exercise of explicitly carrying out the translation of
this model into a private goods economy is not performed here because it is long, and it
would essentially be a duplication of Foley's contribution.
In lemma 1, a useful relationship between the core, agent's offer curves and the Lindahl
equilibria is shown.
Lemma 1. Let SR satisfy A1-A3, B1-B3 and CI. If{x;y) G C{G R ), and for all {r,t} G
GR
,
xr>* G OC\y), then (x;y) G L(GR ).
Proof/
1. If for all {r,t} G GR , x r>* G OC\y), then by the definitions of H* and OC f
3 (p'.'
; q
r
'*) G H\x^- y) s.t. p***; q^x^y) < put*
and
(/^)b(^!/')V(.';/)eI S .t.(p''' (;^)(^;/)</V.
2. Also, since core allocations are feasible by definition,
]T (a^-u/);y) EY.
{r,t}EGR J
3. Finally, suppose
V {r,t} G G R , and V (p r <'; qr ' f ) G A A/ s.t. :
a. {p
r
'
t
',q
r
'
t)eH t (x r ' t ;y) 1
b. (p
rV , ')(aJ r,4;y)<pr,'w t ,
c (x r ' L ;y) ht {x';y') V (hy) G A', s.t. (p rJ ;q rA )(.i;y) < p'-'^'. it is not the case
that
3(pr'*;gr ' t ) G #(x'''<;y), and 3 k rA G (0,1] s.t.
l.'J r,t _ _ /_. ;.1,1 ^ _1,1 j,R,r .. JIJ'\ r- \ \S\MK x p =p,[p;K'Xq , . . . , A- x q j G -A ' '
and.
V(--;y)er,
p; £ k'-'xg'A I £ [*"- i -u»*];v] >
(r,«}6G» / \{r,«}6G«
p; £ *P'*x«r'M(z;y).
{r,t}eGR J
But this would violate the Samuelson conditions. This in ruin contradicts the
hypothesis that {x;y) £ C(GR ) and is therefore Pareto optimal.
The core is said to converge if the condition of lemma 1 is approximately satisfied in
a way which becomes more exact as the economy grows without bound. A sequence of
core allocations {(x R : y
R
)} , where for all R, (x
R
;y
R
) £ C(G ), is said to "e-close" to the
Lindahl allocations, if only a vanishing proportion of the agents in G remain off their
offer curves by at least e as R grows without bound.
More formally, define the coalition S{e,x;y) to be the set of agents who are oil there
offer curves by e at the allocation (x; y):
S(e,x;y) = {{;-,/} 6 GR if V x r >* 6 OC\y), x r < 1 > x rJ + e, or .,•'•' < x rJ - e} . (6)
Then let the function XOC : 3£+ x <RRr x 9ft+ —* [0,1], give the proportion of displaced
agents in 6 .
NOC{e,x;y) = — . (0
The core is said to converge to the set of Lindahl allocations if for any sequence of core
allocations {(x \y )}, and for any e > 0,
lim NOC(e,xR ;yR ) = 0.
In words, the core 1 is said to converge to the set of Lindahl equilibria if for every allocation
in the core of a sufficiently large economy, only a vanishingly small proportion of agent
pay anything even slightly different from their Lindahl tax for whatever Pareto optimal
quantity of public goods is produced by the grand coalition.
It is essential to the lemmas in sections three and four that the correspondence 0C l
be well defined. The purpose of lemmas 2 through 6 is to show that under assumptions
A1-A3 and Cl, OC\y) ^ for any y G 3?+
Lemma 2. Let >: t satisfy A1-A3. Then for all (x;y) G X, H\x,y) ^ 0.
Proof/
Consider the upper contour set of (x; y) G X for >- t '-
U t (x;y) = {(x';y')eX\(x';y')>:t (x\y)}.
By A1-A3, U l {x\ y) ^ and is also closed and convex. Then by the Hahn-Banach theorem.
for all (x ; y ) G X ,
3(p;q)€H t (x,y).
Lemma 3. Let >^ t satisfy A1-A3. Then H l is an UHC correspondence.
Proof/
Let {{x v ;y
v
)} be a convergent sequence in X, let lim,,—^, [x v \ y
u
) = {.r:y). and let
{p
v
\q
u
) G H l {x v \yu ) for all v. Note that (p";*/") exists by lemma 2, and since (p'V/) G
A A/ for all v, there exists a subsequence {{p u \q v )} such that lim i//_00 (p" ; q u ) = (/>;<]) G
A . It must be shown that
(p;5)(5;y) < (p;g)(a';y') V (*'; y') G A' s.t. (x' ]y') y t (}:y).
Suppose not, then
3 (x';y') G A' s.t. {x';y') >- t (£;y)
(#g)fo$>(fc#(*'-;y-)-
10
and
By continuity of preferences,
3 6 > s.t. (x' - e;y') >- t {x:y)
and (p; q)(x; y) > (p; q)(x' - e; y').
But then by continuity of preferences, for sufficiently large v\
(x' -e;y') y t (x"'\yv ).
By the definition of H l
,
for sufficiently large v'
,
(p'V'X^V') < (p'V'X*' -e;y'
Bur.
i i
so
(p
u
\q
v
) -» (p;g), and (or" ; y" ) -* (z;y)
{p;q)(x;ij) < {p;q){x' - e;y'),
a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Let >:< satisfy AJ-A3. Then if' is convex-valued.
Proof/
Suppose not. Then
3(.r;y) el 3 (p; q ),(//; r/) G #'(:r;y) and 3 AG [0.1] s.t.
\(p;q) + (l-\)(p';q') = (p";q")<ZH t (x;y).
Then.
3 (5;y) G A' s.t. (z;y) >-, (z; y) and (//'; g" )( ./: y) > (p";fl")l
which implies.
A {f/v.<y)[(.r;.v)-(.r;y)]}+(l- A) {(//;,/) [(,-:/y)-(.r:.v)]} > 0.
11
However, this is impossible since
(p;q) e H' {x; y) and (p';q') E HHx;y).
Now define the map /* : [0,i^] C 3£+ -> 3£ by:
fl(z) = {7 e $ I 3 (p;g) e ff'foy) and 7 = (p- q)(x - u* ; y)}
.
(8)
This correspondence /* gives the values of excess demand at each of the prices supporting
(x;y). More exactly, it is the differences between the possible values of the endowment
that an agent of type t would have to have, and the value of the one he actually has. if
{x:y) were to be on his offer curve. Thus, for a particular value of y, if G /,,(•?')• then
(.r; y) is on the offer curve of agent of type t.
Lemma 5. 4 Under assumptions A1-A3 and Cl, for all (u;'; y) £ A", there exists x £ [O.^'j
such that e fy{x).
Proof/
Clearly f* is UHC, convex-valued, and non-empty valued since it is the product of
correspondences with these properties. Consider the following subsets of the domain:
D+ = {x e [0,u/]
J
3:6 fy (x) and z > 0}
D~ = {x e [0,w<]
I
3 z e fy {x) and z < 0}
1. Note first that D~ ^ 0. Let (p; q) G ff'(0;y). Then
V(s';y')
€
X s.t. {x'-y') y t (0;y),(p;g)(0;y) < (p; </)(*'; y')-
Then since qy < px' + qy' ,
VAe (0,1], Agy< Aps' + Agy'.
And since Ap < p + (1 — A)(l — p),
Agy < (p-Kl ~A)(1 -p))*' +Mu'-
12
But,
M
p + (1 - A)(l -p) + A J2 K = P + t 1 " A )(! " P) + A ( l - P) = 1-
Therefore,
(p + (l-A(l-p);A«)€JJ*(0;iO.
However, by strict monotonicity of preferences in the private good, p > 0. and so
limp -Ml -A)(l -p) = 1.
A—
But by assumption Cl, u/ > 0. It follows that for small enough A,
(p + (l-A)(l-p))(0-^) + A^<0.
Thus e D~. and so D~ / 0.
2. Also note that D+ ^ 0. By monotonicity of preferences,
V(z;y) 6Xand V (p; ry) E F'(z; */), (p; ?) > 0.
So
p(^' - a,-') + <zy > 0.
Thus a/ E £>+, and so D+ / 0.
3. Finally note that £ f*(x) for all x E [0,0;*] implies D+ H D~ = 0. This follows from
the fact that /* is convex-valued which implies that for any x E [0,u;*], if x E D^~ and
x€D-, then E /£(.r).
4. It only remains to show that D+ D Z)~ 7^ 0. Suppose not. Then since both sets arc
non-empty, at most one of them can be closed. Without loss of generality, suppose
D+ is not closed. Then there exists a sequence, {.*'"}. in D + such that r" —^ .r.
< f
l
y
(x v ) and > f*(x). But this contradicts the UHC of /J on [0,w']. Therefon .
there is some x E R+ such that E /J(.r).
Lemma 6. For nil y E R+ , OC'(j/) /
Proof/
13
From lemma 5,
V(u/;y)eX, 3x-6[0, W (]s.t.0G/;(.r).
But then
3 (p; q) e H\x- y) s.t. (p; g)(z - w*; y) = 0.
Therefore, by definition of H f :
3 (p; g) e #'(>; y) s.t. (p; g)(ar; y) < pw*
and
\f(x';y') e X s.t. {x'-y') y t (x; y), (p; q)(x' ; y') > pw*.
Thus a; G 00%)
14
3. Two Convergence Theorems
Two separate convergence theorems are proven in this section. The first shows I
if for all agents, the value in terms of private good of receiving a given multiple of theii
current public goods consumption level goes to zero as the level of public goods goes to
infinity, then the core converges to the set of Lindahl allocations. This assumption is called
asymptotic satiation, and it is easy to see why it drives the result.
The reason that the core of a public goods economy is typically quite large is that
the grand coalition is able to spread the costs of public goods production more wid<
than any subcoalition. As a consequence, subcoalitions find it difficult to block allocations
offered by the grand coalition even when all the agents in the subcoalition are charged
more than their Lindahl taxes. The larger bundle of public goods that the grand coalition
is able to offer can compensate agents for substantial losses in private good consumption.
But if all agents become asymptotically satiated in public good, then this ceases to be
true. Now agents do not care very much about extremely high levels of public goods
consumption. This puts a limit on the degree to which the grand coalition can "exploit
'
its cost advantage. Suppose, for example, that the grand coalition tried to give even a
small proportion of the agents a level of private good consumption that was less than the
level at a Lindahl allocation. As the economy got large, the members of the subcoalition
would find that they are sufficiently numerous that they could easily produce a bundle
of public goods that is almost as good as the one offered by the grand coalition at lower
cost. The subcoalition would then be able to block the effort to give less private good
than they would get at a, Lindahl allocation. In short, asymptotic satiation removes the
increasing returns to coalitional size that are embedded in the public goods technology. As
a result, even small coalitions are able to block attempts on the part of the grand coalition
to deviate from the Lindahl allocations.
Before giving a formal definition of asymptotic satiation, consider the notion oi com-
pensating variation. This will be used to measure the difference in desirability between
two given bundles of public and private goods. Specifically, the compensating variation
15
is the largest amount of the private good that could be taken away from bundle 2 while
still leaving the agent at least as well off at bundle 1. The compensating variation can
be positive or negative. It is always well defined if it is non-negative (or equivalent ly. the
second bundle is better than the first). Formally, for an agent of type t:
CV\x; y- x'-y') = {maxz e ft
\
(x; y) < t (x' - z; y' )} . (9)
Now asymptotic satiation can be denned as follows:
A4) VxG^+, V(JG(0,1], and yt eT,l\m lly ^^^CV^x; ay; x-y) =0.
Examples of preferences that satisfy asymptotic satiation include those for which
consumers are eventually satiated in public good. An example of preferences which satisfy
asymptotic satiation, but which do not exhibit satiation in public goods can be obtained
by picking any level set of a Cobb-Douglas map, say xy — 1 and translating it up and
down the 45 degree line to get a complete family of indifference curves:
u(x\ y) = -x - y + VV - U) 2 + 4 -
In all of these examples, the offer curves are asymptotic to uj 1 as y goes to infinity. In other
words, the Lindahl taxes go to zero as the bundle of public goods gets large. Lemma 7 shows
that this is a general implication of asymptotic satiation. This means, incidentally, that
Cobb-Douglas preferences do not satisfy asymptotic satiation. It is not hard to confirm
this by noticing that the compensating variation between two bundles as described in
assumption 4 remains constant in the Cobb-Douglas case.
Lemma 7. Let SR satisfy assumptions AJ-A4, D1-D3, and Cl. Then for all t G T
,
lim OC t (y) = u t .
II y II ^°°
Proof/
Suppose not. Then
3 {>/} s.t. || if || -> co and 3 e > s.t. V v\ 3 v > v' and 3 x
lJ
G OC\y u
16
s.t. x
v < LO f — e.
Note that the possibility that x u > u* + e need not be considered since by monotonia
all prices are non-negative and so x v < uj 1 . Also by definition of OC , for all v. and foi
x» eoc f {if)
3 {?-qv ) 6 H\xv ;yv ) s.t. qvyv = p*V " *")•
But since,
it follows that
{p";qv){\u i + \xV ,\y
V)=PVu\
Recall that asymptotic satiation implies that
Vz G &+, and Vt €T, lim C^fx; £y";a:;y 1') = 0.
II
</"
II
— oo
So by monotonia ty, for large v
But by hypothesis,
w — e > x
,
and therefore,
2^ + 2 >L ~ 2 f - * •
So by monotonicity,
(iy + l^-l e;i/)^ ( (x^;i/).
But then by transitivity,
which is a contradiction.
One additional technical assumption will be used to prove this convergence theorem.
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A5) There exists 9 > such that for all t G T, all (x; y) £ AT, and all x > i\ if for all (p; ry) E
JET*(a;;j/) such that Z meM <Jf ^ & then for a11 (???) G #'(*;?). E™ €.M X > ^7-
This assumption says that if the total of the marginal willingness to pay for all types
of public good for an agent of type t (TMWP*) is larger than some q at an allocation
(x;y), then when additional private good is given to the agent, there is a multiplicative
limit 9 on how much the TMWP t can go down. Assumption A5 can be interpreted as
allowing, but limiting the degree to which the marginal rate of substitution of private good
for public goods can increase as the consumption of public goods increases. This may seem
like an odd requirement, but in reality it is only a weakening of better known assumptions.
For example, if preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear in the private good, then 9 = 1.
Alternatively if the ordinary assumption of diminishing marginal rates of substitution in
the private good is made, then 9 > 1. Thus, assumption A5 is not very restrictive.
Theorem 1. Let {SR } be any sequence of economies satisfying A1-A5. B1-B3 and Cl.
Then the core converges to the set of Lindahl allocations.
Proof/
Suppose not. Then there exists a sequence of allocations, {(x
, y
1
')}. such that for all
R, (x R ;y
R
) e C\G R ) and
3 e > and 3 a G (0,1] s.t. V R' 3 R > R' , s.t. NOC(e,x R ;y R ) > a.
Let 5 be coalition of agents who are off their offer curves by at least e. Divide S into two
subcoalitions: S
,
consisting of the agents who are above their offer curves by e or more
(and are therefore paying less than their Lindahl taxes), and S R , consisting of the agents
who are below their offer curves by e or more (and are therefore paying more than their
Lindahl taxes). Formally,
S R+ = {{r,t} e G R | V.r r -' e OC l (y R ),x rJ > !•'•' +6} (10)
and
S R ~ = {{rj} E GR
I
Vi r ' ! e OC'iy 11 ),^' 1 < J-'''' -e}. (11)
IS
Also define the sequence of allocations {(x R
; y
R
)} for the sequence of coalitions {S R ~ }
where xR ,r,i = ~,f - ^e for {rj} G S R and y R is the largest feasible vector of public
goods when all the tax revenue collected by S R is spent on a bundle proportional ro yR .
Four cases are considered.
1. First, suppose
I
9^~
I
|| y
R
|| -> oo and V R' , 3 R > R' s.t. ±-—i- > \a.
Then there exists an arbitrarily large R such that S R can block (x R \y R ) with the
allocation {x R \yR ). To see this note that the most that G can collect in taxes is
TRuJma,x where u;max is the largest endowment held by any agent of any type. On the
other hand, for all R' . there exists R > R' such that the tax revenue collected by S R
is at least collects ^aTR^e. But Y is a convex cone with zero origin, and the tax
revenue of the coalition S R is always at least a fraction, a, of G R 's for arbitrarily
large R where
\aRT\e \ae
a
TRjjma-* a;max '
and so y R > ayR . Since by hypothesis (x R ;y R ) G C{G R ).
V {r,t} G S R~Ax R-^;y R
-)ht (^ ~ \e;ayR ). (12)
Also by monotonicity, all prices are non-negative, and so
V{r,r} G GR ,u l >x R > rJ
But then,
V{r.f} G S R ~V -e>x R ' rJ . (13)
Also by asymptotic satiation for large R,
V {/-,/} eG R
,
lim CV t (xR >r * t ;ayR ;xR >r ' l \y Ii ) = 0.
II y
R
II
-oo
So for Large R:
V {/•,/} G S*",^ 1 - \e;cjy li ) y t (J - e;</ /f ). (14)
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So by (12), (13), and (14),
(x R~^;y R ~ ) ht ("' ~ \*;vyR ) yt (^ - e;yR ) y t (x R^;y R ). (15)
Therefore, SR ~ blocks (x R ;yR ) with (x R ~ ;yR~) for large R
2. Next suppose
I S R ~ I
3 y' e $+ s.t. V R, || yR \\ < y # , and V R! s.t. 3 R > R' s.t. ' ' > ^cv.
Obviously, S^ can block (x R ;yR ) with {(a; ; yR )} for large R. This is because
for all R' , there exist R > R' such that the coalition 5^ collects ^a^eRT in taxes
at (x-^
;
y^ ) and clearly ^a^eRT —> oo. But by assumption 1' is a cone with zero
origin, and so for large R, yR < y R . Also, by equation 13
V{r,f}£5r , xR~
>
r
:' = u>* - ±e > x*''*'
.
In words, 5^ can block {x R ;y R ) with an allocation that gives each of its members
more private good, and more public good. Thus no core allocation can place a fixed
fraction of agents e below their offer curves for large R.
3. Now suppose
|| y
R
\\
-> oo and V R' , 3 R > R' s.t. ' ' > |a.
But by lemma 7,
Therefore, for large R,
VteT lim OC'(y) = w*.
II y II — °°
rt+ „R,r,t > JV{r,t} 6 5^,2^'' >
But then the agents in G R \ S R can block (xR ;yR ) by ejecting the agents in 5^
from G and dividing among themselves the net payment of private goods that would
have gone to these ejected agents. Therefore, no such allocation could be in the core.
4. Finally, suppose
3 y' e R$? s.t. V /?, || y
R
|| < y' V R\ 3 R > R' s.t. J~J- > I tt .
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First notice that
V{r,*} 6 S 7^, V7?, and V^ r '< G OC l {y R ). x rLrJ <u>-e. (16)
Otherwise, if an agent were above his offer curve by e he would be receiving a net
subsidy of private good. Then by the argument given in case 3, this could not be a
core allocation.
But equation 16 and the definition of OC l imply that
V{r,t} eS R\ Vs*'r'' eOC'iy^), and V (pr'*;
$
r
'*) e fl-*(5
R
'
r
-'*;y fl
),
^ p r -< ~ M x y' 1
meM
But by hypothesis,
V{r,t} 6 5 ft+ , and V £ fi ' r '' 6 OC t (yR ),xR > r > t > x R ' r ' 1 .
So by assumption A5,
36>6\V(pr > t ;qr > t)eH t(xR > r ' t ;yR ), Y ^->6q.
m<=M
But then for large R,
{r,t}es>{+ meM
In words, the sum the agents' total marginal willingness to pay for all types of pubic
goods exceeds the marginal cost of uniformly increasing the level of public goods.
Therefore the Samuelson conditions do not hold at (x
,y ), and so the allocation is
not a core allocation as hypothesized.
The second convergence theorem says that if the marginal value of at least one of
the public goods does not go to zero as the quantity of public goods goes to infinity, the
core converges. This assumption is called strict non-satiation and it is even easier to sec
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why it drives the result. For coalitions of sufficiently large size, strict non-satiation implies
that every core allocation is one in which almost all of the private good is used to produce
a Pareto optimal quantity of public goods. This obviously coincides with the Lindahl
Equilibria.
As was noted in the introduction, strict non-satiation is of less practical interest than
asymptotic satiation. It implies that agents have such a strong preference for public activity
that even for economies of moderate size, agents choose to devote all of their resources
to public goods. This might reflect the tastes of members of Utopian communities, but
these preferences are clearly not shared by the majority of consumers. Formally, strict
non-satiation is defined as:
AG) For all (x; y) E A", all t E T and all (p; q) E H l (x; y), there exists m E Ai, and 3 3 >
such that 2sl ;> R
p — r
An example of a class of preferences that satisfy strict non-satiation is any preference
relation in which public goods and private goods are perfect substitutes.
Lemma 8. Let {£R } be any sequence of economies satisfying Al-A3. A6, B1-D3. and Cl.
Let {{x R
; y
R
)} be a. sequence of allocations such that for all R. (xR ; y
R
) E C(GR ). Finally,
given e > 0, let S R = {{r,t} E G R \ xR^ 1 > e] . Then,
I SR I
V e > 0, lim i-^-i- = aR = 0.
/2-oo RT
Proof/
Suppose not. Then
3{(xR ;yR )}s.t. V R,{xR ;yR ) E C(GR ), 3 e > 0, and 3 a E (0, 1]
s.t. V/?', 3R>R' s.t. aR > d.
Let
s^ = {{rj}esR \j = t}.
Then, since there are only a finite number of agents types.
3t' e'T and 3 a E (0, 1] s.t. V R\ 3 7? > R' , s.t. ' € ' = aR '*' > a
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In words, at least a x RT agents of some type t' consume more than e of the private good
at some core allocation for an economy of arbitrarily large size.
Without loss of generality, suppose agents of type t' are strictly non-satiated in public-
good m. Then by strict non-satiation,
V(p'''V) € H\x R^-yR \ q
-fjr > (3 > 0.pr,i
But since by monotonicity all prices are non-negative:
V R', 3R>R' s.t. V (p r <<; q*'*) e Ht (xR>r > t \ y R ) ^ ^ ^7 - aRTil
However, by assumption B3.
V (z; y) e r, and V (p; g) G MCm (z; y), ^ < o.
P
So clearly, for large enough R, < aRT(3. Thus, for large enough /?, the Samuelson
conditions are not satisfied at {x
, y ). This contradicts the hypothesis that {(a, ;y )}
is a sequence of core allocations for G R .
In words, it is impossible for a fixed fraction of agents to consume a positive quantity
of the private good because, eventually, these agents become so numerous that even among
themselves, the marginal benefit of spending their private good on public goods production
exceeds the cost. Thus, no such allocation could be Pareto optimal, much less in the core.
Lemma 9. Let {£ } be any sequence of economies satisfying Al-A3. AG. D1-D3. and Cl.
Let {{xR \yR )} be such that for nil R, {x R ;y R ) e C(GR ). Then
lim OC\yR ) = 0.
R— oo
Proof/
Lemma S implies that
lim y
R— DC ^—
'
{.t}eo n
a, — X — CX.
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Thus, for every t 6 T there is a public good m £ M. satisfying strict non-satiation for
which,
Then suppose,
V R', 3 R>R' s.t. 3 t e T, and 3 e > and 3 x € OC\yR ) s.t. ;r > e.
But then for large R, for agents of type t, since (x ft
;
y^) G C{G R ), the Samuelson condition
and assumption B3 imply that
Vr6^,3 (P^;q^) e H\xR^ ]yR\ s.t. V ^ < *
reft
But this is impossible by strict non-satiation since for large i?,
£% *w > *
r£R F
Note that the two assumptions discussed in this section have exactly opposite impli-
cations for the behavior of the offer correspondence. Strict non-satiation implies that the
offer correspondence converges to zero, while asymptotic satiation implies that it converges
to the agent's endowment. The question core converges when the offer curve does neither
of these things is taken up in the next section. First we show that strict non-satiation is
a sufficient condition for core convergence.cr
Theorem 2. Under assumptions A1-A3, A6, D1-D3, and Cl the core converges to the set
of Lindahl equilibria.
Proof/
By lemma 9,
V{(z*;yK)}s.t. \/R,(xK ]yK)eC(GR ), lim OC\yR ) = 0.
R—'Oo
By lemma S,
R — l J £V e > lim a ' == ' € ' = 0.
~ /,'-oo e RT
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Then since agents can't consume negative quantities of private goods it follows immediately
that,
e > lim NOC(e,xR ;yR ) = 0.
R—> oo
It is worth noting that core convergence also holds if some types of agents in the
economy satisfy asymptotic satiation, and others satisfy strict non-satiation. Theorem 2
says that all almost agents who are strictly non-satiated are almost exactly on their offer
curves for any core allocation of a large enough economy. Theorem 1 says the same for
agents who are asymptotically satiated. Thus, If both types are in a single economy, then
almost all of both types are almost exactly on their offer curves for every core allocation
of a large enough economy. Therefore, the core converges.
2d
4. Non-Convergence
This section explores the conditions under which the core can be shown not to converge
to the set Lindahl equilibrium allocations. Attention is restricted to the class of one private
good, one public good economies satisfying A1-A3, and B1-B3, and for which all consumers
have smooth quasi-linear preferences. Formally, these two additional restrictions on the
economy are:
A7) ForalH G T, y t can be represented by a utility function of the form u l (x; y) = x-\-g t (y)
(Transferable utility)
AS) For all t
€
T
,
and all (x; ij) G A', if (p;q) G # f (z;y) and {p':q') G H l {x;y) then
(p:q) = (p':q').
(smoothness)
Note that assumptions A1-A3 imply that y l {y) is quasi-concave, continuous, and
monotonia Also note that assumption A7 implies that for any (x;y) G A', if [p:q) G
H'{x\y) then (p;q) G H\x';y) for any x' > 0.
Recall that strict non-satiation implies that agents' offer curves converge to zero as
the level of public good goes to infinity. That is, agents pay almost all of their endowment
of private good for high levels of public good consumption at every Lindahl allocation.
Asymptotic satiation, on the other hand, implies that agents 1 offer curves converge to the
agents' endowment. That is, agents pay almost nothing for high levels of public good
consumption at every Lindahl allocation. The main theorem of this section shows that
if neither one of these two conditions holds, then core is larger than the set of Lindahl
allocations regardless of the size of the economy. More specifically, we will show that if for
at least one agent type (without loss of generality, let this be agent type 1). the otter curve
is strictly bounded from both zero and the endowment, then the core does nor converge.
This is in the spirit of negating the 1 conditions that guaranteed convergence, but is logically
unrelated. This condition is given formally below.
A9) There exists e > and there exists y' > such that if y > y' then for all x G
OC l (y), u>t --t> x > e.
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Iii addition we will make the technical assumption that agents of type 1 have strictly
convex preferences.
A10) For all (.r; ;y), (x'\ .(/') 6 X such that y > y' and (x;y) ~ 2 (x';y'), if (p-q) £ H l {x;y)
and (p'; ?')6F(x';y') then *< £.
Lemma 10 uses these the assumptions of strict convexity and transferable utility to
prove a useful fact about the set of supporting prices of type 1.
Lemma 10. For all £R that satisfy A1-A3, A7-A10, B1-B3 and CI, and for all (x: y). (x\
G X such that y > y, if{p\q) G H l {x\y) and (p;q) G H l (x;y) then £ < %
.
Proof/
1. Suppose first that (x;y)
~i (x;y). Then assumption A10 can be used directly to
conclude that the lemma is true.
2. Suppose next that (x; y) >-j (x;y). Then by transferable utility,
3x' >0s.t. (x;y) ~, (x';y).
But then the assumption of transferable utility implies
if(p;g) G H\x;y) then (p;q) G H\x';y).
Also by strict convexity for agents of type 1, if
y > j/,(x';y),~i (x;y){p;q) G H l (x'; y) and (p; </) G H 1 (x:hk
then,
p P
3. Finally, suppose that (.r;y)
-<i {x:y). Again, transferable utility implies that
3x' >0s.t.(i';y)-] (x;y).
But then by transferable utility,
if(p;g) G i^foy) then(p;$)G H l (x':y).
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But then by strict convexity, for agents of type 1, if
V > y,(x';y) ~i {x;y),(p;q) G H l {x;y), and (p; q) £ H l {x;y)
then,
p p
A similar lemma can be proven about all agent types using transferable utility, smooth-
ness, and convexity.
Lemma 11. For SR satisfying A1-A3, A7-A10, B1-B3 and Cl, for all t G T, and all {x: y).
(x;y) G X such that y > y, if{p\q) G H l {x:y) and {p:q) G H\x\y) then £ < f
.
1. Suppose first that [x; y) ~^ (x; y). Then smoothness and convexity directly imply that
the lemma is true.
2. Suppose next that (x;y) >~
t
{x;y). Then by transferable utility,
3 x' > s.t. {x;y) ~, (x';y).
But then the assumption of transferable utility implies that
if (p; q)e H\x\ y) then (f>;q)€ H ] (x': y).
Also by convexity, if
y > y,(i';y)~« U; </), (p; rj) G H l {x']y) and (p; q) G H l (x-y),
then.
£<£.
p p
3. Finally, suppose that {x;y) -<
t (x;y). Again, transferable utility implies that
3x' >()s.t. (*';</•) ~i (x;y).
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Bur then by transferable utility,
if (p;q) G H\x;y) then (p;g) E H\x'\y).
But then by convexity, if
V > y,(x';y) ~< (x;y),(p;q) e H l {x]y), and (p;q) G H f (x;y)
then,
£<£.
p p
This entire section considers a one private, one public good economy satisfying A1-A3.
A7-A10. B1-B3. and Cl. Reference to this fact will be omitted in the statement of the
propositions that follow.
An allocation (x; y) is said to be an equal treatment allocation if all agents of the same
type receive the same level of private good. Lemma 12 says that all Lindahl allocations
are equal treatment allocations.
Lemma 12. For all (,r: y) G L(GR ), (x:y) = {x; y) where for all {r.t} E U x 7
.
*'"
= £ V-
Proof/
Suppose instead that there exists (x\y) G L{G R ) such that for sonic' {r.t} . {r'.t} E
7v x T. x r,< > x r •' Invoking smoothness, let (p.q rJ ) = H'{x rJ ,y). Then by transferable
utility, (}>.<i
rJ
) G H t (xr'' t ,y). But by Lemma 1, .r'"' J G OC"{y) and so there exists
(,/./•') G H'(x r
'
J
,y) such that <y r -' < g
r'.'.
If x
r * > this contradicts smoothness since (/>,</'') = H l (x r J .y).
If ,r
r
•' = this contradicts convexity since by transferable utility, for all (/;.</'
tf'U''-'..,/). ,,'< >,/•'.
Lemma 13 says that for any sequence of Lindahl allocutions, the level of public good
grows without bound as the economy increases in size.
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Lemma 13. For all R, Let (xR ;yR ) G L{GR ). Then
lim v =00.
Proof/
1. First notice
3e >0s.t. Vy > 0, OC 1 ^) > e.
For y > y' this is immediate from assumption A9. So suppose
3ye(0,y')s.t.OC 1 (y) = 0.
But then since y > 0,
3(p;g)eff 1 (o; 1 ;y)s.t.g = 0.
Then by lemma 10,
Vx > Oandy" > y, 3(p;q) G HHx\y"), s.t. - < 0.
But this is impossible since monotonicity implies that prices are positive.
2. Therefore, if y > 0, then for all 7?, the total Lindahl taxes collected by G at everj'
Lindahl allocation is bounded from below by Re. Then since the amount of taxes spent
on public goods goes to infinity as the economy increases in size, and by assumption
each unit of public good costs one unit of private good, y —+ 00.
3. It only remains to show that it is impossible that no public goods be produced at any
Lindahl equilibrium for a sufficiently large economy. Note that
V.r > 0, and V (p; q) G #V;0), 3 q > s.t. q/p > q.
Otherwise by Lemma 10, for y > 0, q < which violates the assumption of mono-
tonicity. But then for large R.
Vi G T, V.r > 0, and V (p; q) G H l (x;0),
(
,r,t
Y J— > Rq > 1.
p{r,t}€G* l
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Thus, the Samuelson conditions are not satisfied for large R and so producing no
public good could not be Pareto optimal, and therefore not a Lindahl allocation.
Let {{x R
; y
R
)} be a sequence of equal treatment Lindahl allocations for the sequence
of economies {£R }- The remainder of this section focuses of constructing a sequence of
allocations that are significantly different from {(xR
; y
R
)} and yet are elements of the core.
In particular, for even numbered replications split the agents of type 1 evenly into two new
types called 1~ and 1 + . Agents {r, 1} for r = 1, . . . , y, will now be referred to as {/. 1~
for /• = 1 y, an<J tne agents {r, 1} for r = y + 1,... ,i2, will now be referred to as
{/•. 1 + } for r = 1 y. For any e G (0, e], consider {x R \ y
R
) as a possible element of the
core where .v n - r - l ~ = x RA - e, for r = 1, . .
. , f , xf'
r,1+
= .r
RA + e, for /• = 1 f , and
.,-/''• '"•' = .v
Rj for /• e R and * = 2 T. In words, {x R \yR ) is an allocation that differs
from the equal treatment Lindahl allocation (x R ;y
R
) only in that all agents of type 1~
are taxed an extra e units of private good, and agents of type 1 + are taxed e less. Note
that by assumption A9. the offer curve of agents of type 1 are strictly bounded from both
zero and the endowment by e. Thus, all agents receive an amount of private good that is
positive but less than u 1 at (x R ;y
R
). In Lemmas 14 through 17 we examin the properti
of coalitions which have the portential to block (xR ;y ).
Lemma 14. If a coalition S G G R can block {x R ; y R ). then it must include some agents
of type 1.
Proof/
Suppose not. Then since agents of types t = 2, . . . , T are exactly as well off at
[xR ;y
R
) as they are at (x R ;y R ). if S can block (xR ;yR ), then S can also block {x
R
;y
R
.
But [x \y ) is a Lindahl equilibrium and therefore in the core. Thus no such S could
lock (.;/';//R. ,.R
Lemma 15. If a coalition S G G R can block {xR ;yR ), then it must exclude some agents
of type 1.
31
Proof/
Suppose 5 is a coalition that can block (x R ;y R ) with an allocation {xs \ys ) and
includes all the agents of type 1. Note that agents of types t = 2, . . . , T are exactly as well
off at (xR
; y
R
) as they are in the (x R ; y
R
), and so must be at least as well off at {x s \ y s )
as at (x R ;y
R
). Consider two cases:
1. Suppose
3 {r,l + } e Ss.t. x s ' r '
1+
< e.
Then since (x 5 - r - 1 + ;y5 ) >n (x R^ + e; yR ), by transferable utility (0; ys ) bi (.t^' 1 ; y R ).
But no agent can receive a negative allocation of private good. This means that the
worst allocation that any agent of type 1 can receive in the coalition 5 is (0; y ). Thus
by transferable utility, all agents of type 1 are already at least as well off at (x ;y )
as at (xR ;y
R
). But then (x
; y ) blocks {x
R
;y ), which is impossible since [x R '.ij R )
is in the core.
2. Now suppose
Vr = l,...,|,x^1+ > e .
Starting from [x
; J/ ), consider we get when each agent of type 1 + transfers 6 private
good his counterpart of type 1~. By transferable utility, both types are at least as
well off as at {x R
\ y
R
), and other agents are unaffected. The coalition S can therefore
block [x R \y
R
) using this allocation. But again contradicts the fact that {x ; y ) is
in the core.
Lemma 16. If there exists a coalition S C G R which can block {x R ;yR ), then {x R ;yR )
can also he blocked by a coalition S' which contains all the agents of type l~ and none of
the agents of type 1 +
Proof/
By lemma 14. S must contain some agents of type 1. Suppose first that
V{r,l) e S,.r 5>J >u l .
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That is. suppose all agents of type 1 pay nothing or receive a net subsidy for being in S
rather than contributing taxes to help produce public goods. Then clearly, it is po
to throw all agents of type 1 out of the coalition S, and still produce an allocation tl
blocks (xf",yR ) by simply producing the same bundle of public goods, and distributi
the subsidy that would have gone to the type l's among the remaining agents. But this
contradicts lemma 14 and so can not be the case.
Thus,
3 {r,l} 6 Ss.t.x^' 1 <u*.
Suppose that this agent happens to be of type 1 + . Recalling that all l + , s are treated
equally in the allocation {x R ;y
R
), by monotonicity,
[v
,y ) ci [x > y ) ii \x ( i y ) ci I ' , , y )
Thus, all agents of type 1 who are not already members S could be included in a larger
coalition S' and be allowed to enjoy ys public good while consuming their full endowment
of private good. In other words, it is possible to admit all agents of type 1 nor already
in S to the coalition for free. These agents are at least as well off as they are at the
allocation (xR \y ), and so this allocation over the coalition S' also blocks {x R ;y ). But
this contradicts lemma 15.
Therefore, no agent of type 1 + can pay positive taxes. As a consequence it is possible
to exclude them from the coalition S and still block. But then
3 {r, 1"} £ Ss.t. xS>rA ~ <u> 1 .
Then following the argument above, recall that all l~'s are treated equally in the allocation
i.//': i/ L ). It follows by monotonicity that.
[^W)ht(xs ' r ' 1 ] ys)ht(x^ 1 ';y l
Thus, all agents of type 1~ who are not already members 5 could be included in a larger
coalition S' allowed to enjoy y s public goods while consuming their full endowment of
private good. These agent are at least as well off as they are at the allocation [x/yy L ).
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and so this allocation over the coalition S' that includes all 1 and excludes all 1 + also
blocks {xR ;yR ).
Lemma 17. If there exists a coalition S C GR which can block (xR ;yR ), then (xR ;yR )
can also be blocked by a coalition S' that contains all the agents of type l~ , no agents of
type 1 + , and is S' -optimal.
Proof/
By lemma 16, if S can block, then an S' which contains all the type l _, s and none
of the type l+ 's can also block. Suppose that the blocking allocation over S' is not S'-
optimal. Then take any Pareto superior and S'-optimal allocation over S' . Clearly, such
an allocation must also block the grand coalition's allocation.
So far we have shown that if (x R ;y R ) can be blocked at all, it can be blocked by a
coalition of the type described in lemma 17. The next step is to exploit the hypothesis
that there exists a blocking coalition which contains no agents of type 1 + to gain more
information about this coalition and the associated blocking allocation.
Consider the question of what it would take to persuade all the agents of type 1 + to
join the blocking coalition. It would be certainly be possible to do so if each of these agents
of type 1+ could be made at least 2e better off in terms of private good than agents of
type 1~. This is because agents of type 1 + get exactly 2e more private good than agents of
type 1~ at (x
e ; y ). However, if S is to remain a blocking coalition, all the original agents
must be at least as well off as they are at (xR \y ) after private good has been collected
to "bribe" the agents of type 1 + join S.
Thus the first question to answer for any such blocking coalition S is what is the
maximum bribe in transferable utility terms that can be offered to each agent of type 1 +
in order to induce them to join the blocking coalition, and yet still leave all the original
agents in S at least as well off as they are at the allocation (xR \y ). The next question,
of course, is whether or not this bribe is sufficient. If the answer is yes. then there exists a
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coalition that includes all the type l's, and that blocks (x R ;yR ). Since this is impossible
by lemma lo. the original blocking coalition S could not have existed. Thus. yR ) is
in the core.
Consider the first question. There are two possible sources for this bribe. The first
is any surplus transferable utility that exists at the blocking allocation. In other words,
suppose that as much private good as possible is taken away from each agent in 5 while
being careful to leave them at least as well off as they are at the allocation (x R
; y
R
). This
surplus could be divided evenly among the types 1 + as a bribe to join S. Notice two things
about this surplus. First, if a coalition blocks, the surplus associated with the blocking
allocation must be positive. Second, since all agents of the same type (understanding
that 1 + and l - are different types) are treated equally in the allocation (xR ',y ), they all
must end up with identical allocations when all possible surplus is taken away from them.
Formally, the surplus is defined as sur : ft ' S ' x ft x RRT x ft —> ft :
sur((x;y)Ai;y))= (|j ^ CVt((xr^- y), (xr'*; y)) (17)
The second possible source for a bribe comes from the fact that types 1 + may be
allowed to join for free. That is, they may be allowed to join while paying no taxes,
and consuming their endowment. Thus the difference between the consumption of private
good by agents of 1~ after all potential surplus has been extracted from them, and the
endowment of type l's, measures how much better off it is possible to make each agent of
type 1 + compared to agents of type 1~ by allowing the l+ 's into S without paying any
taxes. Call this the bonus utility. Formally, the bonus is defined as bon : R x R x
R
RT
X R -> ft :
bon((x;y),(x;y)) = u 1 - {minz
\
(:.y) hi (x
1
'
,£)}
Thus J)oi){{x; //), (i; y))+sur((x; y), (i; y)) is the total amount of private good that can
be given to each l"1" in excess of what agents of type l - get in older to induce them to join
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the coalition 5\ while still leaving all the original agents in S at least as well off as at the
allocation {x R
; y
R
). The next few lemmas describe properties of these two correspondences
on the assumption that (xR
; y
R
) can be blocked with an 5-optimal allocation by a coalition
S that includes all the type l -, s and none of the type l + , s. Since by lemma 17, if (xR
; y
R
)
can be blocked by any coalition it can also be blocked by one having these properties, it is
sufficient to show that the properties shown for this coalition lead to a contradiction.
Lemma 18. For all R, and for any S G GR which contains all types 1~ and no types 1 +
and can block (xR
; y
R
), with an S -optimal allocation (x s ; ys ),
bon((x s - y
5
), (x
R
; y
R
)) + sur((x
s
; */), (x
R
; y
R
)) < 2e.
Proof/
Suppose
bon((xs ]y
s),(xR ',yR )) + sur((x
s
-ys),(x R -yR )) > 2e,
Then there is enough excess private good to leave all the agents in S as well off as they
are at the allocation (if; y
R
) and yet offer each type 1+ a level of consumption that leaves
them 2e better off than each type 1~. But then types 1 + are better off than at (xR
; y ). So
there exists a coalition 5 that has all the type l's, and blocks [xR
] y ). But this contradicts
lemma 15.
Lemma 19. For all R, and for all S C G R which contains all types 1 nnd no types 1 +
nnd can block (x R ;y R ) with an S -optimal allocation (x s ;y s ),
bon((x S ;y s )Ax R -ij R ))>sur((x S ;y S )Ai R ;y R )).
Proof/
Suppose instead that
bon((xS ',ys ),(xR -yR )) = e' < e" = sur((x
s
; </
5
),(lf; y
11
)).
First notice that e1 > 0. This is because if e' < then at the allocation (xs
; y
s
). typt> l~"s
pay no taxes, or may even be getting a net subsidy from blocking coalition S. But then it
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is possible to form another blocking coalition without any type l's at all by producing the
same level of public good and distributing the net subsidy of private good that would ha
gone to the l
_,
s over the rest of the agents in S. This contradicts lemma 14. Also n<
that if 5 is able to block with (xs ;ys ), then sur((xs ; y5 ), (x R ; y R )) > 0. Thus by lemma
IS. e' + e" < 2e, so clearly < e' < e.
Now consider the allocation (xR
_
€
,\ y
R
). This differs from (xR
; y
R
) only in that e — e' is
taken from the type l
-,
s and given to type l + 1 s instead of e. Agents of types t — 2 T
are indifferent between the two allocations. But since
each agent of typo 1 needs to be compensated an additional e' in order to induce him to
stay in the coalition S. Since by hypothesis, e" > e'.
sur((x5 ;y
s ),(xf_ c,;y*)) = e" - e' > 0.
Also, since the maximum contribution of the type l -, s to the production of y , the public
goods level of the blocking coalition must go down by exactly e\
Bur then it would be possible to get rid of all the type l~'s, since they contribute nothing
to public goods production of the coalition S, and still have a blocking allocation for the
remaining agents. But again, this is a contradiction of lemma 14.
Lemma 20. If for given e
€
(O.f] there is a coalition S containing all type 1 s and no
type l + "s which run block [xR \yR ) with an S-optimal allocation {x
S
',y
s
), then for all
e' e [e,e], 5 can also block (xR
\
y
R
) with (xs ;y
s
).
Proof/
Agents of type 1~ arc better off at (x R ;y R ) than at {x R ;y
R
) since e' > e. All other
agents in S are exactly as well off at these two allocations. Thus, all agents in 5 are at
least as well off at (xs ;y
5
) as at (x R \y R ).
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Lemma 21. If for any e 1 £ (0, e], there exists a sequence of coalitions, {S R }, containing
all the type l~'s and none of the type 1+ 's, and a sequence of S R -optimal allocations
sR sR - R(x ( £/) ;y (£/) ) such that there exists R and for all R > R' , S can block the allocation
qR cR
(xR ;y
R
) with an SR -optimal allocation (x (£/) ;y {l>) ), then there exists a sequence of
allocations {(x s ;ys )} for {SR }, such that for all for all e 6 (0, e] there exists R" and
for all R > R"
,
SR can block (xR
; y
R
) with (x s ; y
s
), and for which
?R i-
lim x s '* = uj l
R-+<x>
Proof/
s
R
s
n
Suppose that for any e' 6 (0, e], such a sequence of blocking allcations, (x (t ' >; y ts '
exists. Recall that by lemma IS for all R,
26, > bon((xSZ')- ,/(*)), (x R - y
R
)) + ^n-((/" ); /"' ) ), (5«; y*)).
But by lemma 19,
bon((xS"');yS"')), (x R ;y
R
)) > sur((x
S"'
>
; y
S">
> ), (^;yR )),
and since the coalition blocks,
Therefore
26' >6on((^') ;y^')),(x £/?; 2/ i2))>0.
By lemma 20 and the hypothesis of this lemma there exists R' such that for all R > R'
and for all e £ [e',e], S R blocks (xR ;yR ) with the allocation (,r'
b(
''
>;
y'^"'
> ). Bur £ ; ran be
chosen arbitrarily small by hypothesis. It follows that there exists a sequence of allocations
{(Xs
*1
; y
sH
)} for {S R }, such that for all for all e € (0, e] there exists R" and for all /? > /?".
S* can block {xR ;yR ) with (z5*;y5*), and
lim x s ' l sb-w 1 .
3S
Lemma 22. Let S R C G R be any coalition that contains all type 1~ \s and no typ*
let (xs
; y
s
) be an equal treatment Lindahl allocation for S R and let (x R :y R ) be an
equal treatment Lindahl allocation for G R , then ys < yR .
Proof/
Suppose instead that y
s > y
R
. By lemma 11,
V{r,*} e S R and Vi,x'> 0, if if* > y R ,
I
then \/(pR^ t ;q
R^ t)eH t (x,y R )and V (p5*'^; g5V'<) G J?V> y S * ),
pH,r,t — pSR ,r,t
'
But by assumption A9, agents of type 1 + , who are not included in S , are never satiated
in the public good and so q R ' 1 /p R>1 > 0. It follows that
,R,r,t SR r ty ^— > y q '
'
Z_^ p#,r,* ^ Z^ vSR ,r,t
{r,t}€GRl {r,t}eS^ 1
But Since both allocations are Lindahl allocations, and the marginal cost, of public good
is one,
n R,r,t nSR ,r,t
i= y i— > v i = i
r,t)eG R {r,t}£SR L
a contradiction.
At last we are able to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 3. For any sapience {S R } of one private good, one public good economies
satisfying assumptions Al, A2, A3, AT, AS. A9, A10, Dl. D2. 133. unci Cl the cun- d
not converge to the set of Lindahl allocations.-
Proof/
First we show that the hypothesis of lemma 21 is false, and therefore there exists an
e' > such that for any R' there is an R > R' such that u/f: y R | 6 C{G R ). Suppose not.
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Then by lemma 21, there exists a sequence of coalitions {SR } which contains all the type
l
_1
s and none of the type l + , s, such that for all e 6 (0, e] there exists R" such that for all
R > R"
,
SR can block the allocation (xR ;yR ) with an S^-optimal allocation (xs ;y s )
for which
lim x s
,1_
= w 1 .
Recall that (x s ;ys ) is defined to be any equal treatment Lindahl allocation for the
coalition S
1. Suppose first that y
s > y
s
. Then by lemma 10
-s*,i 5*1
>pS*,l ^ p5«,l
Also by lemma 11,
*
€
T, V^'V*'') g H'^.'jy**), and V (/*><; <r^) 6 tf 1^- 1/
ry
3 ,r
ry
5
'
l
7 ) *"^ i 7) '
Then since the marginal cost of public good is 1,
1= y q—< y «— = i = i
a. contradiction.
2. Now suppose that ys < y s . Then by lemma 10,
VhiLV^'/Jlefl 1^/), a^d V(/"- l ;,y i "-')e/f'(^" 1 :,^
g*«,l 5".l
<
P^>
,1 p^> ,1
Also by lemma 11,
< 6 T. V^f" •«) € //'(I- S "-';ysn ), and V (/"<: ,*"< ) G ff'(.r 5"'w/'
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But then
SR ,t *SR ,t
l = E T^> E ^T7 = 1 -
a contradiction.
3. Finally suppose that y
s
= y
s
. But then since all agents not of type 1 are at least as
well off at the blocking allocation as they are at the grand coalition's allocation, and
by lemma 22 the grand coalition produces more public good at a Lindahl allocation
as does the subcoalition S R
,
Also, by lemma 21, x '* — u 1 . But by assumption A9, for large R:
r
5H ,l . ,1 ^ ,1 , > T.S
R AX —> uJ ,> uj — c ^_ X
But then
[uj - x ' j = y < (w - a: ) = y ,
a contradiction.
Therefore there must exist an e' > such that (xR
; y
R
) is in the core for economics of
arbitrarily large size. If not then there must exist a coalition containing all the type l _ 's
and none of the type l~'s which blocks (xR ',y ) with a Pareto optimal allocation that has
neither more, nor less, nor exactly y public good. Clearly this is impossible.
But then all agents of type l
-
are e' below their offer curves, while agents of type 1 +
are e' above their offer curves at this core allocation. Thus, for large /?, {x R
\ y
R
) £ C{C U
and yet
NOC(t';x*;yR)=±
Therefore, the core does not converge to the set of Lindahl allocations.
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5. Conclusion
Muench showed that core of a public goods continuum economy is not necessarily
equivalent to the set of Lindahl allocations. The question of the generality of this result
was left open. This paper goes part way to giving an answer. Both asymptotic satiation
and strict non-satiation are shown to be sufficient to guarantee core convergence for a class
of convex and monotone public goods economies. These two conditions, however, appear
to describe be extreme cases. Asymptotic satiation implies that the offer correspondences
converge to the endowment, and that in the limit, a negligible part of each agent's enow-
ment of the private good is devoted to public goods production at any core allocation.
Strict non-satiation, on the other hand, implies that the offer curves converge to zero, and
that essentially all of the private goods are devoted to public goods production at any core
allocation in the limit. The last section of the paper showed that for a more restricted
class of economies, the core does not converge in the intermediate case 1 where the offer
curves are strictly bounded away from both the endowment point and zero. One extension
of this research would be to show that gencrically, offer curves are bounded from zero and
the endowment, and so generically, the core of a public goods economy docs not converge
to the Lindahl allocations. It would also be interesting to attempt to refine these results
to give an exact characterization of the ecomonies for which the core converges perhaps by
using a more tractable economic environment.
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